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Abstract
1 
This paper shows that budget deficits account for a relatively small fraction of 
debt growth and that stock-flow reconciliation, which is often considered a 
residual entity, is one of the key determinants of debt dynamics. After having 
explained the importance of the stock-flow reconciliation, the paper shows that 
this residual entity can be partly explained by contingent liabilities and balance-
sheet effects.  
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1. Introduction 
 
How do countries get into debt? The answer to this question may seem trivial. Countries 
accumulate debt whenever they run a budget deficit (i.e., whenever public expenditure is higher 
than revenues). In fact, the standard Economics 101 debt accumulation equation states that the 
change in the stock of debt is equal to the budget deficit: 
t t t DEFICIT DEBT DEBT = − −1       (1) 





i t t DEFICIT DEBT
0
. 
Whoever has worked with actual debt and deficit data knows that Equation (1) rarely holds and 
that debt accumulation can be better described as: 
t t t t SF DEFICIT DEBT DEBT + = − −1      (2) 
where  t SF  is what is usually called “stock-flow reconciliation.” Clearly, Equation (1) is a good 
approximation of debt accumulation only if one assumes that  t SF  is not very large. The purpose 
of this paper is to describe some of  t SF ’s main characteristics. The paper shows that, contrary to 
what is usually assumed, the budget deficit accounts for a small fraction of the within-country 
variance of the change in debt over GDP and that stock-flow reconciliation plays an important 
role in explaining debt dynamics. The paper also shows that, on average,  t SF  tends to be positive 
and that there are large cross-country differences in the magnitude of this residual entity. This 
suggests that the magnitude of stock-flow reconciliation is not likely to be purely due to random 
measurement error. In particular, the paper shows that the problem is especially serious in 
developing countries and, among this group of countries, the difference between debt and deficit 
is particularly large in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The paper also runs a set of regressions aimed at explaining the main determinants of the 
magnitude of the stock-flow reconciliation and finds that balance-sheet effects due to real 
depreciations and contingent liabilities that arise at time of banking crises are strongly correlated 
with the difference between deficit and change in debt. However, the paper also shows that the 
regressions can only explain 20 percent of the within-country variance of the stock-flow   5
reconciliation and that there is still much that we do not understand about one of the main 
determinants of debt accumulation. 
While we are not the first to show that stock-flow reconciliation is an important part of 
debt dynamic (see, among others IMF, 2003; Martner and Tromben, 2004; European 
Commission, 2005; Budina and Fiess, 2005), we are not aware of any other paper that 
systematically describes the main characteristics of this residual, but extremely important, 
determinant of debt accumulation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our main sources of 
data and presents some basic facts on public debt and deficit. Section 3 focuses on a detailed 
description of the stock-flow reconciliation. Section 4 runs a set of regressions aimed at 
explaining the main determinants of the stock flow reconciliation. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
The purpose of this section is to describe our data on fiscal deficit and public debt. In this 
context, it is worth mentioning that obtaining reliable and comparable data on the stock public 
debt is a rather difficult exercise. In fact, the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) and 
IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS), which are the most common sources of cross-country 
data on government statistics, report data for a rather limited set of countries. This is even the 
case for industrial countries; these sources do not report recent data on public debt for Japan and 
Italy, for example. Furthermore, most cross-country datasets do not make an effort to make the 
data comparable across countries (for a discussion of these issues, see IMF, 2003).
2  
Although there are now some papers that attempt to build comparable cross-country data-
sets on public debt (Cowan et al., 2005; Jeanne and Guscina, 2006; IMF, 2003; Budina and 
Fiess, 2005), some of these data sets are not publicly available and all of them have a limited 
country and time coverage. As a consequence, we do not rely on these new data and only use 
publicly available sources (hence, the caveats mentioned above should be kept in mind). In 
particular, we start with IFS and GFS and supplement them with data collected from national 
sources (mostly from the websites or publications of the various Ministries of Finance), the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC, see Martner and Tromben, 
2004), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).   
                                                           
2 The most important problems include the treatment of sub-national governments and the use of gross versus net 
debt (for a methodological note, see Cowan et al., 2005).     6
Using these various sources, we assemble an unbalanced panel covering 117 countries 
and consisting of approximately 1,900 observations. Table A1 in the Appendix lists all the 
countries included in our dataset, the time coverage for each country, and summary statistics for 
debt and deficit ratios. Our sample includes 24 high-income countries, 59 middle-income 
countries and 34 low-income countries. The regions with the largest number of countries are 
Sub-Saharan Africa (27 countries) and Latin America (25 countries). South Asia and East Asia 
are the regions with the smallest number of countries (five and eight countries, respectively). 
While long time series are available for some countries (e.g., Bahamas, Burundi, Costa Rica, 
Iceland, Norway and the US have more than 30 years of data), for others there are very few 
observations (Albania, Algeria, Gabon, Sudan, Togo, and Yemen are among the countries with 
less than five years of data).  
Table 1 shows that the sample mean of the deficit to GDP ratio is 4.04 percent and that 
average deficit tends to decrease with the level of income. The region with the highest average 
deficit is South Asia (6.5 percent), followed by the Middle East (5.6 percent), and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (4.2 percent). Latin American countries tend to have fairly low levels of average deficit 
(just below the cross-country average) but the region is far from being homogeneous and is 
characterized by the largest variance in the sample.  
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the debt-to-GDP ratio and shows that the cross-
country average is close to 56 percent. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are the regions with 
the highest levels of debt (67 and 60 percent, respectively) and East Asia and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia are the regions with the lowest level of debt (35 and 37 percent, respectively). Latin 
America has a level of debt that is just below the sample average and is not much higher than 
that of the industrial countries included in our sample. Again, we find that Latin America is one 
of the most heterogeneous regions in our sample (in this case, second only to Sub-Saharan 
Africa). As one may expect, we find that most of the variance in debt-to-GDP is due to 
differences across countries (this is the between standard deviation). However, there is also 
substantial variance within countries. In fact, the within standard deviation (not reported in the 
table) is often close to 50 percent of the between standard deviation.    7
Table 3 focuses on the change in debt divided by GDP ( t i d , ).
3 If Equation (1) were to 
hold, the change in debt should be equal to the budget deficit. By comparing Table 2 with Table 
3, we find that the value of  t i d ,  is almost five percentage points higher than average deficit over 
GDP, indicating that more than 50 percent of the average change in debt is not explained by 
deficit.
4 The Table also shows that while the difference between  t i d , and the deficit is fairly small 
in industrial countries (about 0.3 percentage points), this difference is extremely large in Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the average deficit is about one-third the average 
change in debt.  
We can now describe the characteristics of the stock-flow reconciliation by defining the 
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, = δ  ). Table 4 describes  t i, δ  and shows that the change in debt is nearly five 
percentage points higher than the deficit (with the highest values in Latin America and Sub-
Saharan Africa). However, the Table also shows that there are several countries with extremely 
large values of  t i, δ  (in some cases well above 200 percent). In Latin America, for instance, the 
difference between the change in debt and deficit has a range of 350 percentage points (from –73 
                                                           
3 It is important to note that we do not use the change in the debt-over-GDP ratio (i.e.,  100
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t i ). As nominal GDP 
growth (g) tends to be positive,  t i d ,  is usually larger than  t i, θ . We use this measure, rather than the standard  t i, θ  
because we want to isolate changes in debt from changes in the level of GDP. 
4 Using a different methodology and a shorter sample, IMF (2003) also finds similar but less drastic results. In 
particular, it finds that more than 25 percent of the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio of a sample of emerging market 
countries over the 1997-2003 period is due to off balance-sheet factors. In a sample of 21 market-access countries, 
Budina and Fiess (2005) find that debt over GDP increased by 22.8 percentage points from 1994 to 2002, while real 
GDP grew by 9.3 percent, yielding a change in debt of approximately 37 percent. The deficit (primary plus interest 
rate bill) explained about one-third of this change while other factors (including the real exchange rate) explained 
the remaining two-thirds.    8
to 281). The industrial countries have the smallest range, but even in this case the range is close 
to 30 percentage points. These extreme values are due either to exceptional events or 
measurement error. In the second column of Table 5, the average value of  t i, δ  is computed by 
dropping the top and bottom 2 percent of the distribution. After dropping these outliers, we find 
that  t i, δ  has an average value of 3 percent and that the average values of  t i, δ  for Latin America 
and the Middle East drop from 7 percent to 4 and 2 percent, respectively. 
It is also interesting to see which countries tend to have large values of  t i, δ . Table 5 
summarizes all the episodes for which  10 , > t i δ (a full list of episodes is reported in Tables A2 
and A3 in the appendix). There are 238 country-years (corresponding to 13 percent of 
observations) for which  10 , > t i δ , and 50 country-years (3 percent of observations) for 
which 10 , − < t i δ . The industrial countries, East Asia, and South Asia are the regions with the 
lowest number of episodes (and very few episodes where  10 , − < t i δ ). Sub Saharan Africa, the 
Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America are the regions with the largest number of 
episodes.  
While this paper focuses on change in debt, we obtain the same results if we use the 
standard decomposition of the change in debt over GDP (θ).
5 Figure 1 shows that in most regions 
the stock flow adjustment is the main determinant of debt growth and inflation is the main 
determinant of debt reduction 
3. Debt and Deficit 
The previous section showed that simple comparisons of average values of deficit over GDP and 
change in debt indicate that Equation (1) is far from being a good approximation of the main 
determinants of debt accumulation and that what is usually considered a residual entity (the 
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where the first term on the RHS of the equation is the contribution of the primary deficit, the second term is the 
interest bill, the third term is the contribution of nominal growth (which can be split into real growth and inflation) 
and the last term is the stock-flow adjustment.   9
stock-flow reconciliation) is a key determinant of debt accumulation. In this section, we use 
different strategies to provide more evidence in this direction.  
3.1 Regressions Analysis 
One way to assess the importance of  t SF  is to divide debt and deficit by current GDP and use 
our large panel to estimate the following fixed effects regression: 
i t i t i i t def d , , , * ε β α + + =      (4) 
where  i α  is a country fixed effect (the country fixed effects control for the fact that the data 
come from different sources, countries have different levels of debt, and they use different 
methodologies for computing debt and deficit) and  i t def ,  is deficit over GDP. If Equation (1) 
holds, we expect a high R
2 (the regression’s R
2 should be 1 if Equation 1 holds exactly),  i α =0, 
and  β =1. Hence, the regression’s coefficients and R
2 can be used to asses the relative 
(un)importance of the deficit in explaining changes in debt. Table 6 reports the results of the 
estimation of Equation (4) for different sub-samples of countries. Column 1 describes the basic 
pattern. First of all, we find that β  is greater than 1 (but not significantly different from 1) 
indicating that a 1 percent increase in the deficit to GDP ratio tends to translate into a 1.3 percent 
increase of the debt to GDP ratio. More interestingly, the regression’s R
2 shows that, in our 
sample of countries, deficits explain less than 8 percent of the within country variance of  i t d ,  and 
that  t SF  explains more than 90 percent of the variance.
6   
As the low R2 could be due to the presence of outliers, in Column 2 we drop 47 outliers 
(defined as observations that have residuals with an absolute value greater than 2.5 standard 
deviations). After dropping these outliers, β  drops to 1.18, but we still find that our model can 
only explain 23 percent of the variance of  i t d , . Figure 2 plots the fit of the regression reported in 
Column 2 and illustrates that the low R2 is not due to a few episodes with a particularly low fit, 
but that most countries have observations that are far away from the regression’s line. Column 3 
                                                           
6 We also ran separate regressions for the 58 countries for which there are at least 15 years of data. We found that 
β  had average and median values of approximately 1 and ranged between –1.8 (Zaire) and 5.9 (Rwanda). The 
regressions’ R2 had an average value of 0.32, a median value of 0.25, and ranged between 0.007 (Egypt) and 0.87 
(Italy). There are only four countries (all industrial) that have an R2 above 0.8,  16 countries (11 of them industrial) 
for which the R2 is higher than 0.5, and 18 countries for which the R2 is less than 0.1.   10
of Table 4 addresses the outlier issues by running the same regression as in Column 1 using a 
median quantile regression with bootstrapped standard errors (STATA’s BSQREG) and shows 
that in this case, the coefficient of the deficit variable drops to 0.87 and the R2 goes to 0.24.   
The remaining columns run separate regressions for different regions of the world. 
Column 4 focuses on 29 countries located in Sub-Saharan Africa and finds that the deficit 
explains only 3 percent of the variance of  i t d , . Columns 5 and 6 show that in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (25 countries) and South Asia (5 countries), the deficit explains between 5 and 6 
percent of the variance of  i t d , .  Columns 7 and 8 focus on East Asia (8 countries) and the Middle 
East and North Africa (11 countries) and show that the deficit explains between 14 and 20 
percent of the within country variance of  i t d , . The developing region with the best fit is East 
Europe and Central Asia (Column 9, 15 countries). In this case, the deficit explains 23 percent of 
the variance of  i t d , . Only in the sub-group of industrial countries (Column 10, 24 countries) does 
the deficit explain more than one-quarter of the within country variation of  i t d , but even in this 
case, the regression can only explain half of the variance of the dependent variable.  
3.2 Theoretical R2 
As an alternative way to describe the pattern documented above, we build a measure aimed at 
determining which countries have the largest deviation from the theoretical identity  def d = . 
Clearly, such a measure cannot be the country average of  t i, δ  described in Table 5 because 
negative and positive values of  t i, δ  would compensate each other. One possibility would be to 
adopt a strategy similar to the one of the previous section and run country-by-country regressions 
of  DEBT Δ  over DEFICIT  and use the fit of these regressions (their R2) as a measure of how 
much a country deviates from  def d = . One problem with this strategy is that it would not help 
to differentiate countries that have a good fit in which  def d =  holds, from countries that have a 
good fit but where the relationship between debt and deficit can be better described with an 
equation of the type:  t t t def d ε β α + + = *w i t h   0 ≠ α  and  1 ≠ β . An index that addresses these 






















φ      (5) 
Note that  i φ  is always non-negative and naturally relates to the R2 of a regression of 
t i d , over  def. In fact, if we write  t t t def d ε β α + + = *  and, if instead of estimating the 
regression’s parameter, we force  0 = α  and  1 = β , the R2 of the model would be 1- i φ . Hence, if 
the true parameters describing the relationship between debt and deficit were  0 = α  and  1 = β , 
i φ  would be equal to 0. Thus, higher values of  i φ  indicate larger deviations of the true 
parameters from  0 = α  and  1 = β . Figure 3 illustrates the theoretical distribution of i φ  for 
different values of β under the assumptions that  0 = α ,  10 = α , and  10 − = α . The figure shows 
that when  0 = α  the distribution is asymmetrical with  i φ  rapidly going towards infinite when β  
tends to 0, and  i φ  converging to around 1.5 when β  goes to infinite, the figure also shows that 
i φ  is equal to 0 when β =1. When  10 = α , the distribution becomes monotone but still going to 
infinite when β goes to 0 and converging to approximately 1.5 when β  goes to infinite. When 
10 − = α the distribution reaches a minimum when β  is around 4 and then starts increasing and, 
again, converges at around 1.5. 
Figure 4 shows the values of  i φ for our sample of countries. Few countries have a value 
of  i φ  close to 0 and most countries are concentrated in the 0.5-1.5 range. In particular, 15 percent 
of countries have values of  i φ that are below 0.5 (the lowest value, 0.009, is for Finland), 30 
percent of countries have values that range between 0.5 and 1, 35 percent of countries have 
values that range between 1 and 1.5, and the remaining 20 percent have higher values. Table 7 
shows that the mean and median of the distribution of  i φ  is approximately 1 and that, as 
expected, the industrial countries have the lowest value of  i φ  and Latin America and the Middle 
East have the highest values of  i φ .
7  
                                                           
7 It may seem surprising that while the theoretical distribution is highly skewed, the data of Table 7 indicate that the 
mean is identical to the median. This is due to the fact that Table 7 does not include four countries that have values 
of φ greater than 4 (these countries are Estonia, Seychelles, Luxembourg, and Sudan).  If we include these countries, 
the median goes to 1.05, but the average jumps to 2.7.   12
3.3  Debt Explosions 
So far, we documented that there are a large differences between deficit and change in debt. Now 
we explore whether the difference between these two variables is positively correlated with debt 
growth. Figure 5 plots the relationship between the growth rate of debt over GDP (defined as 
( ) 100 1 , 1 , , , , × − = − − t i t i t i t i t i Y D Y D θ ) and the ratio between deficit and change in debt (defined as 
t i t i t i d def , , , = ρ ).
8 It shows that at relatively low levels of debt growth (below 5 percent per 
year), the deficit explains approximately 80 percent of the change of debt. However, when debt 
starts growing at a faster rate, the share of debt explained by deficit drops dramatically. In 
particular, the figure shows that when annual debt growth reaches 10 percent of GDP, the deficit 
explains less than 40 percent of debt growth. Table 8 regresses  t i, θ  over  t i, ρ  (controlling for 
country fixed effects) and confirms that there is a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between these two variables. While the fit of the regression is rather poor, the table 
shows that the fit improves if extreme values of  t i, θ  are not considered (compare, for instance, 
Column 1 with Column 3 where episodes in which  t i, θ >50 are dropped). The table also shows 
that the relationship between  t i, θ  over  t i, ρ  does not vary much across groups of countries.  
As a last exercise, we look at debt explosions (defined as episodes in which  t i, θ >10); 
Table 9 summarizes the data and Table A4 lists all the episodes. The first panel of Table 9 shows 
that in the 172 episodes for which  t i, θ >10 (9 percent of the country-years for which we have 
data), the average increase in debt over GDP was close to 28 percentage points, the average 
change in debt was around 46 percentage points (the difference between these two values is 
nominal GDP growth which, in presence of high inflation, can be very high), and the average 
ratio between these two variables was 70 percent. The fourth column of the table shows that in 
our sample of debt explosions, average deficit was close to 10 percent of GDP and the ratio 
between deficit and change in debt was about 27 percent. This is close to one-third of the same 
ratio during normal times (when 10> t i, θ >0 the ratio between deficit and change in debt is 75 
percent). The table also shows that the regions with the highest occurrence of debt explosions are 
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa (41 and 66 episodes, respectively) and that East Europe 
                                                           
8 We smooth the curve with a bandwidth of 25.   13
and Sub-Saharan Africa are the regions with the lowest average ratio between deficit and change 
in debt (18 and 13 percent, respectively).   
Since the average values discussed above may be driven by extreme values of  t i, θ , we 
restrict the sample in the second panel of Table 9 to 104 episodes for which  t i, θ  ranges between 
10 and 20 percent. In this case, we find that the average increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
approximately 14 percent, the average change in debt is 24 percent and the average ratio between 
these two variables is 68 percent (basically identical to the top panel of the table). The fourth 
column of the table shows that the average deficit is 7 percent and that the ratio between average 
deficit and change in debt is 29 percent, which again is close to the top panel of the table. As 
before, we find that Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa have the highest occurrence of debt 
explosions (18 and 36, respectively), but now we find that the Middle East and the industrial 
countries have a number of episodes that are not much lower than those of Latin America. In 
fact, we now find that Latin America has the second lowest (after the industrial countries) 
relative share of debt explosions. This confirms that debt explosions in Latin America tend to be 
very large. In fact, Latin America is the only region in the world where there are more episodes 
in which debt grows by more than 20 percent of GDP than episodes in which debt grows 
between 10 and 20 percent of GDP.  
4. What Drives the Difference? 
After having documented that there are large differences between deficits and change in debt, we 
now run a set of regressions aimed at exploring the determinants of these differences. We start 
by estimating the following model:  
t i t i t i i t i X , , , , ε γπ β α δ + + + =      (6) 
where  i α  is a set of country fixed effects,  t i X , a set of country-year specific variables that can 
explain the difference between deficit and change in debt, and  t i, π  is a measure of inflation 
(defined as ln(1+INF)). Although we do not have a clear theory of how inflation should affect 
t i, δ , we include this variable because the various components of  t i, δ  are nominal variables 
measured in different periods of time (a stock at time t, a stock at time t-1 and two flow variables 
measured between t-1 and t). Hence, whenever the deficit is different from the change in debt,   14
the value of  t i, δ  should be positively correlated with nominal GDP growth, which is heavily 
influenced by inflation.  
One reason why the change in debt could be higher than the recorded deficit is the 
valuation effects due to currency depreciations in the presence of foreign currency debt. To 
explore this possibility, we start by focusing on developing countries (industrial countries do not 
have large stocks of foreign currency debt) and use data from the World Bank’s Global 
Development Finance (GDF) to create three dummy variables that classify all developing 
countries into three groups of equal size.
9 The three dummies are defined as follows: (i) LOW 
takes a value of 1 for all country-years where the external debt-to-GDP ratio is below 38 percent; 
(ii) MEDIUM takes a value of 1 for all country-years where the external debt-to-GDP ratio 
ranges between 38 and 64 percent; (iii) HIGH takes a value of 1 for all country-years where the 
external debt-to-GDP ratio is above 64 percent. Next, we interact the three dummies with the 
change in the real exchange rate (DRER, an increase in DRER corresponds to a real 
depreciation).  
Column 1 of Table 10 reports the results of our baseline estimation. As expected, we find 
that inflation has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Furthermore, we find that 
currency depreciations are positively and significantly correlated with δ , a finding that provides 
evidence of the presence of balance-sheet effects. More interestingly, we find that the effect of 
currency depreciations is particularly large in countries with high levels of external debt. 
Consider, for instance, a real depreciation of 30 percent (not an uncommon event in some of the 
countries included in our sample). In countries characterized by low or medium levels of external 
debt, such a depreciation is associated with an increase of δ  of approximately three to four 
percentage points, but in countries with high levels of debt, a similar depreciation would instead 
cause δ to increase by more than 10 percentage points. At the bottom of the table we show that 
the difference between coefficients is also statistically significant (this is not the case for the 
difference between the coefficients associated with low and medium external debt).  
Next, we include industrial countries and assume that this set of countries has no foreign 
currency denominated external debt. Therefore, the regression coefficients should be interpreted 
                                                           
9 Since the GDF data have information for total external debt, we are implicitly assuming that most external debt is 
public (or generates contingent liabilities of the public sector). We checked the validity of this assumption by 
computing the correlation between GDF data on total external debt and IFS data on public external debt and found 
that this correlation is 0.91.    15
as follows: DRER measures the effect of real depreciations in industrial countries; 
DRER+DRER*LOW measures the effect of a real depreciation in developing countries with low 
levels of external debt; DRER+DRER*MEDIUM measures the effect of a real depreciation in 
developing countries with average levels of external debt; and DRER+DRER*HIGH measures 
the effect of a real depreciation in developing countries with high levels of external debt. Column 
2 shows that the coefficient of DRER is low and not statistically significant, indicating that there 
are no balance-sheet effects in industrial countries. As before, we find that balance-sheet effects 
are important in developing countries and that the effect of a real depreciation in all three groups 
of developing countries is significantly different (both in economic and statistical terms) from 
the effect of a depreciation in industrial countries. Finally, we still find that balance-sheet effects 
tend to be particularly important in countries with high levels of debt.  
Column 3 explores the role of default, w expect defaults to be associated with debt 
reduction and hence negatively correlated with δ . To capture the effect of default, we use data 
from Standard and Poor’s and build a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 around the last year 
of a default episode (in particular, it takes a value of 1 in the last year of the episode and in the 
year before and the year after the last year of the episode). Next, we build a default dummy that 
takes a value of 1 in the last year of a Paris club rescheduling and then another dummy that takes 
a value of 1 whenever the GDF reports that a country has rescheduled its debt. Finally, we build 
a dummy called DEFAULT that takes a value of 1 whenever one of the previously described 
dummies takes a value of 1. Column 3 shows that the default dummy has the expected negative 
sign but that the coefficient is small and not statistically significant (we obtain similar results if 
we use the three dummies separately).   
Column 4 uses data from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) to explore the role of banking 
crises. These are important events because they generate a series of contingent liabilities and 
other off-balance sheet activities that can translate into debt explosions. As expected, we find 
that the coefficient of the banking crisis dummy is positive and statistically significant. The 
coefficient is also quantitatively important, indicating that the average banking crisis is 
associated with an increase of three percentage points in δ .  
Column 5 jointly includes all the variables discussed above. We find that the results are 
qualitatively similar to previous ones, but that the coefficient of DRER*MEDIUM is no longer 
statistically significant (however, DRER+ DRER*MEDIUM remains significant) and that the   16
same is true for banking crisis. In the last column of the table, we control for year fixed effects 
(which implicitly control for global shocks) and show that their inclusion does not affect our 
basic results.  
It is interesting to note that the set of controls included in the regressions of Table 10 
explains about 20 percent of the variance of δ  and that the country fixed effects explain about 
30 percent of the variance of δ  (see last row of Table 10). This indicates that country specific 
factors explain most of the variance of δ  and corroborates the findings of Table 4, which 
showed that there are large cross-country differences in the average value of δ . There are two 
possible explanations for this finding. The first has to do with the fact that measurement errors 
that lead to an underestimation of the deficit are more important in some countries than in others, 
which is probably related to the fact that poorer countries have less sophisticated accounting and 
budgeting systems. The other has to do with the fact that the importance of contingent liabilities 
that lead to debt explosions vary across countries and that our set of controls does not capture all 
these contingent liabilities.
10  
Table 11 includes GDP growth in the analysis. The first column shows that debt tends to 
grow more than deficit during periods of slow GDP growth. Column 2 substitutes GDP growth 
with two dummies variables that take a value of 1 during periods of high growth (GOOD 
TIMES) and periods of slow growth (BAD TIMES).
11 Also in this case, we find that debt tends 
to grow faster than the deficit during bad times and slower than the deficit during good times. 
Column 3 augments the regression in Column 1 with the set of controls in Table 10. We find that 
the sign of GDP growth remains negative but the coefficient drops by one-third and is no longer 
statistically significant. Column 4 uses the set of controls in Table 10 and the GOOD TIMES and 
BAD TIMES dummies. In this case, we still find that the two dummies have the opposite sign 
and are both statistically significant. 
In Table 12 we estimate a set of regressions similar to those in Table 10 but now 
substitute δ  with d and include def in the set of controls. This is equivalent to estimating the 
model of Table 10 by relaxing the restriction that the coefficient of def is 1. We find that the def 
coefficient is always smaller than 1 but that that this coefficient is never significantly different 
                                                           
10 Another key difference is in the size of the regional government, which is often not well captured by our data. 
11 GOOD TIMES takes a value of 1 when growth is one standard deviation above the country average, BAD TIMES 
takes a value of 1 when growth is one standard deviation below the country average. REGULAR TIMES is the 
excluded dummy.   17
from 1. All our other results are unchanged (this was expected because Table 6 already indicated 
that the deficit by itself explains an extremely small share of the within-country variance of the 
change in debt). 
One problem with the regressions of Tables 10, 11 and 12 is that they assume a linear 
relationship between the dependent variable and the set of independent variables. Therefore, the 
estimated results might be driven by extreme values of δ . To address this issue, we relax the 
linearity assumption and run two sets of Probit regressions. In the first set of Probits, the 
dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 for all country years in the top decile of 
the distribution of δ . In the second set of Probits, we repeat the experiment using the bottom 
decile of the distribution of δ. 
12   
Table 13 reports the results for events in the top decile (in this group of events, δ ranges 
between 12.7 and 282 and has an average value of 44.5). We find that most of the results are 
similar to those in Table 10. In particular, Column 1 shows that the relationship between real 
depreciations and the probability of observing an extreme event of δ  increases with the level of 
external debt. Column 2 shows that in industrial countries, real depreciations have a negative 
(but not statistically significant) correlation with the probability of observing an extreme event of 
δ. This column also shows that in countries with high levels of external debt, depreciations are 
highly correlated with the probability of observing an extreme event. One puzzling result of 
Table 13 is that the coefficient of the DEFAULT dummy is large, significant, and positive 
(Column 3). This is exactly the opposite of what we expected, and may have to do with the fact 
that defaulted debt is not immediately subtracted from the stock of public debt. The coefficient of 
the BANKING CRISIS dummy variable instead has the expected positive sign. Besides being 
statistically significant, the impact of this variable is also economically important. In particular, 
the point estimates indicate that a banking crisis is associated with a 10 percent increase in the 
probability of observing an extreme event of δ. 
Table 14 focuses on events in the bottom decile of δ  (in this group of events, δ ranges 
between -116 and –3.4 and has an average value of -10.9). As expected, we find that 
depreciations are negatively correlated with these types of events but the coefficients are rarely 
significant. In general, we find that our model does a very poor job of explaining these events.  
  
                                                           
12 The results do not change if we define the dummies using the |δ|>10 threshold.   18
5. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to document the fact that what is often considered a residual entity 
is indeed one of the key determinants of debt dynamic. After demonstrating the importance of 
the stock-flow reconciliation, this paper shows that this residual entity can be partly explained by 
contingent liabilities and balance-sheet effects. These results suggest that building a safer debt 
structure and implementing policies aimed at avoiding the creation of contingent liabilities are 
key to avoiding debt explosions (for contrasting views on how this can be achieved, see 
Goldstein and Turner, 2004 and Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2003). However, this 
paper also shows that a large fraction of the variance of the stock-flow reconciliation cannot be 




                                                           
13 One variable that is likely to be important but that we do not control for is the effect of court decisions that force 
the government to make payments (to public sector workers, for instance) that were not budgeted. We would like to 
thank Vito Tanzi for pointing this out.   19
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Table 1. Deficit over GDP 
 
Country Group  σ (%) 
 
μ 









All Countries  4.04  5.27  3.62  -18.26  66.05  117  1872 
By Region 
EAP 2.65  3.08  2.86  -2.35  17.87  8  126 
ECA 3.38  3.51  2.89  -10.02  19.64  15  142 
IND 3.29  3.78  2.92  -6.89  20.79  24  485 
LAC 3.93  7.38  4.56  -5.27  66.05  25  417 
MNA 5.57  6.24  6.02  -9.92  26.78  11  201 
SAS 6.53  3.16  1.75  -1.73  18.28  5  119 
SSA 4.24  4.77  2.74  -18.26  45.15  29  382 
By Income Groups 
Low 4.67  4.40  2.76  -18.26  45.15  34  440 
Medium 4.13  6.18  4.28  -10.02  66.05  59  947 
High 3.29  3.78  2.92  -6.89  20.79  24  485 





Table 2. Debt over GDP 
 











N. of  
observations 
All Countries  55.80  58.05  46.92  0.00  637.52  117  1872 
By Region 
EAP 35.28  19.58  19.96  1.49  98.02  8  126 
ECA 37.19  21.85  22.41  2.49  88.70  15  142 
IND 43.91  26.75  27.08  1.47  121.53  24  485 
LAC* 48.36  41.62  41.97  1.63  304.50  24  391 
MNA** 46.81  40.84 40.09 0.00  210.76  10  172 
SAS 60.27  21.97  16.04  5.92  116.48  5  119 
SSA 66.86  53.97  46.42  1.98  299.73  29  382 
By Income Groups 
Low 72.21  56.50  49.57  1.49  304.50  34  440 
Medium 54.27  67.94 48.02 0.00  637.52  59  947 
High 43.91  26.75  27.08  1.47  121.53  24  485 
The income group and regional classifications are those used by the World Bank.  
* Excludes Guyana ** Excludes Israel 
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Table 3. Change in Debt over GDP 
 













N. of  
observations
All Countries  8.97  23.42  14.66  -118.17  303.57  117  1872 
By Region 
EAP 5.11  9.08  6.42  -7.05  51.81  8  126 
ECA 6.74  9.34  5.74  -5.71  74.38  15  142 
IND 4.05  4.52 3.16  -10.77  22.49  24  485 
LAC 11.45  31.31 16.37  -72.38  303.57  25  417 
MNA 12.59  34.05  17.25  -31.86  300.14  11  201 
SAS 7.98  8.12  3.18  -35.33  42.19  5  119 
SSA 13.00  29.02 22.13  -118.17  233.42  29  382 
By Income Groups 
Low 14.30  31.28 22.25  -118.17  243.68  34  440 
Medium 9.00  24.39  11.54  -61.52  303.57  59  947 
High 4.05  4.52  3.16  -10.77  22.49  24  485 






Table 4. Change in Debt Minus Deficit (δ) 
 
μ (%)  σ (%)  Country 
Group 
   All 
Without 







N. of  
observations
All Countries  4.93  3.15  21.84  13.29  -116.61  281.93  117  1872 
By Region 
EAP 2.46  2.46  7.99  4.28  -10.00  51.14  8  126 
ECA 3.35  2.86  8.37  4.91  -11.03  72.56  15  142 
IND 0.77  0.79  2.83  1.07  -12.16  14.07  24  485 
LAC 7.52  4.32  28.82  13.68  -73.29  281.93  25  417 
MNA 7.02  2.44  31.39  14.62  -39.15  273.36  11  201 
SAS 1.45  2.14  7.55  1.86  -38.58  37.41  5  119 
SSA 8.76  6.11  28.12  21.22  -116.61  226.90  29  382 
By Income Groups 
Low 9.63  6.09  30.85  21.57  -116.61  247.90  34  440 
Medium 4.87  3.09  21.88  8.87 -64.66  281.93  59 947 
High 0.77  0.79  2.83  1.07  -12.16  14.07  24  485 
The income group and regional classifications are those used by the World Bank.  
*Outliers are the top and bottom 2 percent of the distribution. 
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Table 5. Episodes with  10 , > t i δ  
 
  Episodes with δ>5 Episodes  with  δ<-5 
  Number  Share of total  Number  Share of total 
EAP 12  9.52  1  0.79 
ECA 18  12.68  1  0.7 
IND 6  1.24  1  0.21 
LAC 71  17.03  12  2.88 
MNA 35  17.41  13  6.47 
SAS 7  5.88  3  2.52 
SSA 89  23.3  19  4.97 





Table 6. Change in Debt over GDP and Deficit  
(regressions with country fixed effects) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Deficit 1.316 1.189 0.872 1.102 1.101 
 (0.226)***  (0.052)***  (0.066)*** (0.430)** (0.354)*** 
N. Obs  1872  1825  1872  382  417 
Nr. Cty  117  117  117  29  25 








 (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Deficit 0.706 1.346 2.486 1.426 0.914 
 (0.295)**  (0.361)***  (0.840)*** (0.346)*** (0.056)*** 
N.  Obs  119 126 201 142 485 
Nr. Cty  5  8  11  15  24 
R2  0.065 0.135 0.199 0.228 0.514 
Sample SAS  EAP MNA ECA  IND 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 7. Φ Index 
 












All Countries  1.03  0.50  1.03  2.46  0.13  110 
By Region 
EAP 0.98  0.32        0.95  1.56 0.58  8 
ECA 0.98  0.62  1.00  2.06  0.15  14 
IND 0.60  0.36  0.55  1.37  0.13  23 
LAC 1.21  0.51  1.23  2.41  0.15  25 
MNA 1.35  0.47  1.29  2.46  0.89  10 
SAS 1.01  0.12  1.04  1.11  0.81  5 
SSA 1.15  0.42  1.15  2.13  0.19  25 
By Income Groups 
Low 1.15  0.43  1.15  2.13 0.19  31 
Medium 1.13  0.50  1.14  2.46 0.15  56 





Table 8. Change in Debt and ρ (controlling for country fixed effects)  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
θ  -0.007 -0.011 -0.020 -0.018 -0.006 
  (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)***  (0.013)  (0.008) 
Constant  0.718 0.746 0.788 0.837 0.640 
  (0.030)*** (0.033)*** (0.036)*** (0.121)*** (0.079)*** 
Observations  1061 1055 1039  64  77 
Number  of  Countries 110 110 110  8  14 
R-squared  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Sample  θ>0  0<θ<100  0<θ<50  EAP, θ>0 ECA,  θ>0 
  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
θ  -0.019 -0.003 -0.024 -0.008 -0.005 
 (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.006)***  (0.003)**  (0.008) 
Constant  0.817 0.593 0.877 0.576 1.053 
  (0.049)*** (0.061)*** (0.044)*** (0.068)*** (0.179)*** 
Observations 285  235  67  223  110 
Number of Countries  24  24  5  25  10 
R-squared  0.01 0.00 0.22 0.03 0.00 
Sample  IND, θ>0 LAC,  θ>0 SAS,  θ>0 SSA,  θ>0 MNA,  θ>0 
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Table 9. Debt Explosions 
 
  θ  d  θ/d def  def/d  N  Share 
  All Episodes with θ>10 
ALL 27.45  46.34  69.25%  9.42  27.40%  172  9.19% 
EAP 18.82  26.98  74.47%  6.11  24.40%  12  9.52% 
ECA 20.90  27.23  72.50%  5.07  18.65%  11  7.75% 
IND 12.59  15.25  82.78%  9.11  60.79%  13  2.68% 
LAC 34.08  58.92  74.43%  14.63  35.27%  41  9.83% 
MNA 30.22  63.75  60.28%  13.37  41.48%  23  11.44% 
SAS 19.87  26.71  69.79%  7.57  32.61%  6  5.04% 
SSA 28.63  47.08  64.95%  6.35  12.58%  66  9.52% 
  All Episodes with 10<θ<20 
ALL 13.45  24.39  67.88%  6.93  29.42%  104  5.56% 
EAP 13.45  21.20  73.66%  4.79  24.38%  9  7.14% 
ECA 13.33  19.60  69.10%  3.81  18.04%  9  6.34% 
IND 12.59  15.25  82.78%  9.11  60.79%  13  2.68% 
LAC 14.40  22.21  72.73%  7.76  31.71%  18  4.32% 
MNA 13.07  40.93  62.40%  11.05  48.67%  15  7.46% 
SAS 11.97  20.49  59.21%  8.74  42.15%  4  3.36% 
SSA 13.65  24.33  61.56%  5.13  11.64%  36  9.42% 
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Table 10: The Determinants of δ  
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INFLATION 25.526  24.869  25.428 25.136 25.223 25.885 
  (11.454)** (11.199)** (11.285)** (10.775)** (11.346)** (11.581)**
DRER*LOW 14.034  11.496     11.331 5.288 
  (6.522)** (6.732)*     (6.787)* -6.794 
DRER*MEDIUM 11.358  9.218     8.315 1.996 
  (5.059)** (5.171)*     -5.323 -6.22 
DRER*HIGH 32.987  30.835     32.229 25.802 
  (10.423)*** (10.469)***    (10.588)*** (10.738)**
DRER    2.22     1.95 8.676 
   (1.513)     (1.589) (3.715)** 
DEFAULT     -0.077    -1.754 -2.471 
     (2.015)    (1.981) (1.963) 
BANKING CRISIS      3.204 2.812 2.182 
            (1.918)* (1.908)  (1.909) 
R-squared (within)  0.218 0.224  0.19  0.199 0.234 0.244 
Observations  1065 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 













Fixed  Effects  Country Country Country Country Country  Ctry.-Year
DRER*LOW=DRER*MED  0.7654 0.7392      0.6757 0.6536 
DRER*HIGH=DRER*MED  0.0612 0.0524      0.0396 0.0359 
R-squared with country FE  0.4783 0.4825 0.4559 0.4584 0.4852 0.5025 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent;  
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Table 11. The Determinants of δ  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
INFLATION 24.443  24.541  26.064  24.646 
  (11.130)** (10.838)** (12.533)** (11.305)** 
DRER*LOW   15.872  15.998 
     (7.496)**  (6.276)** 
DRER*MEDIUM   4.183  4.376 
     (5.526)  (5.874) 
DRER*HIGH   35.377  35.300 
     (11.147)***  (10.440)*** 
DRER     -0.493  -0.240 
     (1.814)  (1.828) 
DEFAULT     2.091  2.338 
     (2.062)  (1.860) 
BANKING CRISIS    -2.902  -2.921 
      (2.519)  (1.979) 
GDP GROWTH   -0.324    -0.198   
 (0.118)***    (0.130)   
GOOD TIMES DUMMY    -1.822    -1.582 
   (0.857)**    (0.847)* 
BAD TIMES DUMMY    3.772    2.933 
   (1.241)***    (1.200)** 
Observations  1528 1529 1238 1529 
Nr. of Countries  102 102  92  102 
R-squared (within)  0.1064 0.1104 0.1670 0.1550 
Fixed Effects  Country  Country  Country  Country 
Sample  All Countries  All Countries  All Countries  All Countries   27
Table 12. The Determinants of d 
 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
DEFICIT/GDP 0.982  0.943 0.994 0.982 0.933 0.955 
  (0.185)*** (0.143)*** (0.148)*** (0.149)*** (0.144)*** (0.153)***
INFLATION 25.536  24.917  25.433 25.152 25.274  25.89 
  (11.486)** (11.213)** (11.342)** (10.824)** (11.343)** (11.559)**
DRER*LOW 14.017  11.251     11.036 5.145 
  (6.461)** (6.505)*     (6.558)* -6.673 
DRER*MEDIUM 11.377  9.074     8.134 1.93 
  (5.040)** (5.190)*     -5.339 -6.237 
DRER*HIGH 33.033  30.782     32.17 25.84 
  (10.378)*** (10.497)***    (10.615)*** (10.724)**
DRER    2.421     2.181 8.746 
   (1.545)     (1.613) (3.729)** 
DEFAULT     -0.076    -1.75 -2.485 
     (2.011)    (1.977) (1.966) 
BANKING CRISIS      3.214 2.85 2.222 
            (1.927)* (1.914)  (1.917) 
R-squared (within)  0.1914 0.1983 0.2419 0.2503 0.2026  0.229 
Observations  1065 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 
Nr.  of  Countries  78  102 102 102 102 102 
All All All All All  Sample Developing 
Countries  Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries 
Fixed  Effects  Country Country Country Country Country  Ctry.-Year
DRER: LOW=MED       0.7114  0.7447     0.681  0.6571 
DRER: HIGH=MED  0.053  0.0514      0.0386  0.0349 
R-squared with country FE  0.5074 0.5188 0.4939 0.4962 0.5213 0.5373 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; 
   *** significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 13. Probit Regressions for Episodes in Top δ  Decile 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
INFLATION 0.251  0.225  0.160 0.224  0.132  0.151 
  (0.084)*** (0.072)*** (0.060)***  (0.077)***  (0.055)**  (0.064)** 
DRER*LOW 0.098  0.134      0.140  0.060 
 (0.169)  (0.159)      (0.158)  (0.179) 
DRER*MEDIUM 0.190  0.249     0.241  0.197 
 (0.115)*  (0.122)**      (0.120)**  (0.128) 
DRER*HIGH 0.567  0.550      0.402  0.314 
 (0.136)***  (0.136)***      (0.129)***  (0.147)** 
DRER   -0.067     -0.078  0.005 
   (0.075)     (0.080)  (0.099) 
BANK CRISIS    0.099  0.072  0.050 
      (0.029)***  (0.028)***  (0.026)* 
DEFAULT     0.222    0.187  0.191 
     (0.032)***    (0.032)***  (0.033)*** 
Observations  1066 1529 1529  1529  1529  1389 
Nr. of Countries  78  102  102  102  102  102 












FE  NO NO NO  NO  NO  YEAR 
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 14. Probit Regressions for Episodes in Bottom δ Decile 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INFLATION -0.005  0.014  0.002 0.011 -0.014  -0.017 
  (0.035)  (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) 
DRER*LOW -0.161  -0.163      -0.180  -0.193 
 (0.184)  (0.210)      (0.216)  (0.211) 
DRER*MEDIUM -0.320  -0.277      -0.293  -0.336 
 (0.168)*  (0.201)      (0.204)  (0.210) 
DRER*HIGH -0.055  -0.024      -0.063  -0.141 
 (0.130)  (0.169)      (0.165)  (0.187) 
DRER   -0.003      -0.002  0.049 
   (0.120)      (0.125)  (0.147) 
BANK CRISIS  0.039  0.040  0.058 
       (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.028)** 
DEFAULT   0.051  0.051  0.054 
     (0.026)**   (0.026)*  (0.026)** 
Observations  1066  1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 













FE  NO  NO NO NO NO  YEAR 
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.   30
Table A1. Countries Included in the Sample 
 
Country  Code  Region Initial year Final year Debt/GDP Deficit/GDP  δ  φ 
FIJI* FJI  EAP  1972  1998  30.69  4.24  -0.93  0.88 
INDONESIA IDN  EAP  1973  1999  34.77  1.32  4.34  1.15 
KOREA KOR  EAP  1981  1997  13.96  0.59  1.59  0.82 
MALAYSIA MYS  EAP  1991  1999  47.02  0.15  0.41  0.65 
MONGOLIA MNG  EAP  1993  2001  73.08  8.94  11.99  1.15 
PAPUA  NEW  GUINEA PNG  EAP  1976 2002  45.79 2.45  2.66  1.56 
SOLOMON ISLANDS*  SLB  EAP  1976  1984  15.00  4.41  -1.72  0.58 
THAILAND THA  EAP  1997  2003  20.26  1.72  2.30  1.02 
ALBANIA ALB  ECA  1996  1998  48.78  11.07  0.00  0.76 
BELARUS BLR  ECA  1993  1998  23.65  2.05  13.32  1.26 
CROATIA HRV  ECA  1996  2002  42.75  1.48  4.98  2.06 
CYPRUS CYP  ECA  1977  2003  48.77  4.68  1.14  0.83 
CZECH REPUBLIC  CZE  ECA  1994  2003  12.69  1.38  0.18  0.27 
ESTONIA EST  ECA  1997  2001  3.72  -0.95  0.88  6.46 
GEORGIA GEO  ECA  1997  2003  61.53  2.78  5.52  1.31 
HUNGARY HUN  ECA  1992  2003  67.49  5.46  3.54  1.16 
LATVIA LVA  ECA  1996  2003  12.54  1.37  0.04  0.41 
LITHUANIA LTU  ECA  1999  2002  27.65  2.43  -0.23  0.15 
POLAND POL  ECA  1994  2001  44.71  1.63  2.49  1.18 
RUSSIA RUS  ECA  1994  2003  55.76  2.60  13.06  1.49 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  SVK  ECA  1996  2003  27.07  1.38  2.88  2.04 
TAJIKISTAN TJK  ECA  2001  2001  80.87  -0.06  -5.65  0.28 
TURKEY* TUR  ECA  1972  2001  21.80  5.12  2.93  0.57 
AUSTRALIA AUS  IND  1979  2002  12.25  0.80  -0.35  0.77 
AUSTRIA AUT  IND  1972  1994  31.85  3.99  -0.35  0.41 
BELGIUM BEL  IND  1972  1998  84.55  6.47  0.53  0.27 
CANADA CAN  IND  1975  2001  41.40  3.43  -0.21  0.32 
DENMARK DNK  IND  1981  2000  66.78  1.02  3.65  0.78 
FINLAND FIN  IND  1991  1998  52.11  8.00  0.03  0.13 
FRANCE FRA  IND  1993  1997  41.12  5.25  -0.89  0.81 
GERMANY DEU  IND  1976  1999  19.23  1.62  0.29  1.03 
GREECE GRC  IND  1994  1999  117.34  10.15  2.14  0.73 
ICELAND ISL  IND  1973  2003  31.74  2.22  2.87  1.21 
IRELAND IRL  IND  1982  1999  84.11  4.01  1.21  0.24 
ITALY ITA  IND  1981  1999  93.88  9.56  0.65  0.13 
JAPAN JPN  IND  1981  1993  48.65  3.45  0.52  0.98 
LUXEMBOURG* LUX  IND  1991  1997  2.89  -0.06  0.45  81.77 
MALTA* MLT  IND  1972  1998  25.61  2.30  0.56  0.86 
NETHERLANDS NLD  IND  1981  1998  52.97  3.56  0.10  0.14 
NEW ZEALAND  NZL  IND  1993  2001  43.07  -1.40  -0.14  0.54 
NORWAY NOR  IND  1972  2003  26.19  0.61  1.39  1.37 
PORTUGAL PRT  IND  1981  1998  56.47  6.17  2.17  0.59 
SPAIN ESP  IND  1972  1999  31.84  3.45  0.68  0.37 
SWEDEN SWE  IND  1972  1999  46.97  4.40  0.47  0.49 
SWITZERLAND CHE  IND  1987  2003  21.00  0.50  0.83  0.99 
UNITED KINGDOM  GBR  IND  1972  1999  45.46  3.25  0.51  0.55 
UNITED STATES  USA  IND  1972  2003  35.71  2.45  0.00  0.17 
ARGENTINA ARG  LAC  1994  2003  59.87  1.56  11.56  1.22 
BAHAMAS, THE  BHS  LAC  1972  2003  25.55  2.29  -0.08  0.60 
BARBADOS BRB  LAC  1978  2003  54.32  3.74  0.58  0.64 
BOLIVIA BOL  LAC  1991  2003  65.45  4.37  3.53  1.24 
BRAZIL* BRA  LAC  1992  1998  26.98  6.86  7.67  1.31 
CHILE CHL  LAC  1989  2001  25.41  -1.20  2.78  2.03 
COLOMBIA COL  LAC  1991  2003  25.81  3.79  1.96  0.71 
COSTA RICA  CRI  LAC  1972  2002  30.01  2.86  2.54  1.38 
ECUADOR ECU  LAC  1991  2003  63.52  -0.30  0.79  1.01 
EL SALVADOR  SLV  LAC  1972  2001  34.26  1.72  2.70  1.21 
GRENADA GRD  LAC  1994  1995  39.28  -0.57  -2.75  0.15 
GUATEMALA GTM  LAC  1991  2003  16.02  1.19  0.69  1.25 
GUYANA GUY  LAC  1972  1997  324.91  22.46  44.22  1.23   31
HAITI HTI  LAC  1997  2003  46.26  2.03  5.04  1.80 
HONDURAS* HND  LAC  1972  2003  58.45  4.12  4.95  1.10 
JAMAICA* JAM  LAC  1981  2001  117.41  6.79  12.70  1.13 
MEXICO* MEX  LAC  1972  2003  32.28  3.84  4.68  0.71 
NICARAGUA NIC  LAC  1991  2003  216.01  1.57  56.61  1.56 
PANAMA PAN  LAC  1972  2000  55.53  3.29  1.60  0.97 
PARAGUAY PRY  LAC  1991  2001  19.26  0.63  3.76  1.43 
PERU PER  LAC  1991  2001  53.56  0.97  12.08  1.37 
ST. VINCENT & GRENS.  VCT  LAC  1987  2001  47.48  2.34  2.13  1.60 
SURINAME* SUR  LAC  1972  1986  35.67  7.12  -3.07  0.38 
URUGUAY URY  LAC  1993  2001  26.48  2.18  4.14  1.74 
VENEZUELA, REP. BOL.  VEN  LAC  1972  1985  11.39  -0.07  2.43  2.41 
ALGERIA DZA  MNA  2000  2001  0.06  -6.98  6.98   
BAHRAIN, KINGDOM OF  BHR  MNA  1982  2001  16.62  3.29  -1.40  2.46 
ISRAEL ISR  MNA  1973  2001  183.28  9.81  47.95  1.36 
JORDAN JOR  MNA  1972  2001  86.11  4.50  4.27  0.96 
LEBANON LBN  MNA  1993  1999  92.82  17.41  6.81  1.53 
MOROCCO* MAR  MNA  1972  2003  64.11  5.94  -0.87  0.89 
OMAN OMN  MNA  1972  2001  22.51  7.23  -5.08  1.51 
SAUDI ARABIA  SAU  MNA  1996  2000  104.01  4.08  -1.90  1.10 
TUNISIA TUN  MNA  1972  2000  47.49  3.70  1.64  0.90 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES*  ARE  MNA  1981  1999  1.63  0.05  -0.23  1.22 
YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF  YEM  MNA  1996  1999  7.18  2.39  0.35  1.54 
INDIA IND  SAS  1975  2001  46.15  5.85  0.28  1.04 
MALDIVES MDV  SAS  1982  2003  49.53  5.38  -1.20  1.01 
NEPAL* NPL  SAS  1975  2003  51.04  4.51  2.45  0.81 
PAKISTAN PAK  SAS  1972  1993  65.37  7.26  2.03  1.11 
SRI LANKA  LKA  SAS  1974  2001  84.91  8.97  3.49  1.07 
BURUNDI BDI  SSA  1972  2003  85.08  1.68  11.81  1.52 
CAMEROON* CMR  SSA  1991  1999  95.99  2.01  16.75  1.29 
CHAD TCD  SSA  1991  2001  58.26  7.40  -1.27  1.09 
CONGO, DEM. REP. OF*  ZAR  SSA  1972  1997  88.63  4.57  46.20  1.39 
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF  COG  SSA  2000  2000  160.76  -1.16  -68.32   
COTE D IVOIRE*  CIV  SSA  1995  2001  135.29  0.69  1.38  0.97 
ETHIOPIA ETH  SSA  1983  1999  75.28  5.93  4.30  0.98 
GABON GAB  SSA  1991  1991  53.53  1.66  12.15  1.69 
GAMBIA, THE  GMB  SSA  1974  1982  27.66  6.50  -0.62  0.19 
GHANA* GHA  SSA  1972  1998  22.64  3.75  0.79  1.03 
GUINEA* GIN  SSA  1991  1999  93.75  3.33  5.46  1.18 
KENYA KEN  SSA  1998  2003  64.98  1.28  2.95  2.13 
LESOTHO* LSO  SSA  1988  2003  79.17  3.61  4.70  1.09 
MALAWI* MWI  SSA  1972  1987  69.11  7.40  5.00  0.62 
MALI MLI  SSA  1983  1983  67.77  7.01  -5.22   
MAURITIUS MUS  SSA  1979  2003  46.54  3.55  2.22  0.53 
NAMIBIA NAM  SSA  1990  2000  18.59  3.50  -0.61  1.19 
NIGERIA NGA  SSA  1972  1998  57.88  2.56  9.69  1.15 
RWANDA RWA  SSA  1978  2003  54.48  3.85  0.95  0.94 
SENEGAL* SEN  SSA  1983  2001  78.44  3.66  4.58  0.66 
SEYCHELLES SYC  SSA  1973  1977  5.09  0.56  0.11  17.06 
SIERRA LEONE  SLE  SSA  1975  2003  105.52  7.63  18.21  1.56 
SOUTH AFRICA  ZAF  SSA  1981  2003  34.98  3.64  0.74  0.93 
SUDAN SDN  SSA  1998  1999  203.80  0.65  62.55  90.39 
SWAZILAND SWZ  SSA  1979  2003  26.70  0.72  2.27  1.42 
TOGO TGO  SSA  1984  1986  89.77  2.94  -4.78  1.61 
UGANDA UGA  SSA  1992  2003  67.66  3.53  1.17  1.29 
ZAMBIA* ZMB  SSA  1978  1998  176.77  10.98  42.30  1.48 
ZIMBABWE ZWE  SSA  1977  1997  49.49  6.83  1.46  0.84 
*Break in the series  32
Table A2. Episodes with δ>10 
Country Year  Code  Region Country Year Code Region Country Year  Code  Region
INDONESIA   1986  IDN   EAP   JAMAICA   2001  JAM   LAC   BURUNDI   1983  BDI   SSA  
INDONESIA   1997  IDN   EAP   JAMAICA   1999  JAM   LAC   BURUNDI   2003  BDI   SSA  
INDONESIA   1982  IDN   EAP   MEXICO   1987  MEX   LAC   BURUNDI   1992  BDI   SSA  
INDONESIA   1978  IDN   EAP   MEXICO   1986  MEX   LAC   BURUNDI   1989  BDI   SSA  
KOREA   1981  KOR   EAP   MEXICO   1994  MEX   LAC   CAMEROON   1994  CMR   SSA  
MONGOLIA   1998  MNG   EAP   MEXICO   1982  MEX   LAC   CHAD   1999  TCD   SSA  
MONGOLIA   1993  MNG   EAP   MEXICO   1989  MEX   LAC   CHAD   1995  TCD   SSA  
MONGOLIA   1996  MNG   EAP   MEXICO   1985  MEX   LAC   CONGO, DEM. REP. OF   1989  ZAR   SSA  
MONGOLIA   1994  MNG   EAP   NICARAGUA   1991  NIC   LAC   CONGO, DEM. REP. OF   1990  ZAR   SSA  
PAPUA NEW GUINEA   1994  PNG   EAP   NICARAGUA   2001  NIC   LAC   CONGO, DEM. REP. OF   1997  ZAR   SSA  
PAPUA NEW GUINEA   2001  PNG   EAP   NICARAGUA   2000  NIC   LAC   CONGO, DEM. REP. OF   1981  ZAR   SSA  
PAPUA NEW GUINEA   1997  PNG   EAP   NICARAGUA   1995  NIC   LAC   CONGO, DEM. REP. OF   1993  ZAR   SSA  
ALBANIA   1997  ALB   ECA   NICARAGUA   1998  NIC   LAC   CONGO, DEM. REP. OF   1992  ZAR   SSA  
BELARUS   1994  BLR   ECA   NICARAGUA   1993  NIC   LAC   CONGO, DEM. REP. OF   1996  ZAR   SSA  
BELARUS   1998  BLR   ECA   NICARAGUA   1992  NIC   LAC   CONGO, DEM. REP. OF   1994  ZAR   SSA  
CROATIA   1998  HRV   ECA   NICARAGUA   1997  NIC   LAC   CONGO, DEM. REP. OF   1995  ZAR   SSA  
CROATIA   1999  HRV   ECA   NICARAGUA   1999  NIC   LAC   CONGO, DEM. REP. OF   1980  ZAR   SSA  
GEORGIA   1998  GEO   ECA   NICARAGUA   2002  NIC   LAC   COTE D IVOIRE   1995  CIV   SSA  
GEORGIA   1999  GEO   ECA   NICARAGUA   1994  NIC   LAC   ETHIOPIA   1994  ETH   SSA  
GEORGIA   1997  GEO   ECA   PANAMA   1993  PAN   LAC   ETHIOPIA   1993  ETH   SSA  
HUNGARY   1993  HUN   ECA   PANAMA   1996  PAN   LAC   GABON   1991  GAB   SSA  
RUSSIA   1998  RUS   ECA   PARAGUAY   2001  PRY   LAC   GHANA   1996  GHA   SSA  
RUSSIA   1996  RUS   ECA   PERU   1991  PER   LAC   GUINEA   1998  GIN   SSA  
RUSSIA   1995  RUS   ECA   PERU   1998  PER   LAC   KENYA   2000  KEN   SSA  
RUSSIA   1994  RUS   ECA   PERU   1992  PER   LAC   LESOTHO   1996  LSO   SSA  
RUSSIA   1999  RUS   ECA   PERU   1993  PER   LAC   LESOTHO   2000  LSO   SSA  
SLOVAK REPUBLIC   2002  SVK   ECA   ST. VINCENT & GRENS.   1999  VCT   LAC   LESOTHO   1998  LSO   SSA  
SLOVAK REPUBLIC   2001  SVK   ECA   BAHRAIN, KINGDOM OF  1988  BHR   MNA   LESOTHO   2001  LSO   SSA  
TURKEY   1981  TUR   ECA   ISRAEL   1996  ISR   MNA   MALAWI   1986  MWI   SSA  
TURKEY   2001  TUR   ECA   ISRAEL   1977  ISR   MNA   NIGERIA   1989  NGA   SSA  
DENMARK   1993  DNK   IND   ISRAEL   1979  ISR   MNA   NIGERIA   1988  NGA   SSA  
DENMARK   1983  DNK   IND   ISRAEL   1988  ISR   MNA   NIGERIA   1987  NGA   SSA  
ICELAND   1984  ISL   IND   ISRAEL   1993  ISR   MNA   NIGERIA   1978  NGA   SSA  
IRELAND   1983  IRL   IND   ISRAEL   1998  ISR   MNA   NIGERIA   1983  NGA   SSA  
NORWAY   1986  NOR   IND   ISRAEL   1975  ISR   MNA   NIGERIA   1990  NGA   SSA  
SWEDEN   1980  SWE   IND   ISRAEL   1985  ISR   MNA   NIGERIA   1981  NGA   SSA  
ARGENTINA   2002  ARG   LAC   ISRAEL   1989  ISR   MNA   NIGERIA   1980  NGA   SSA  
ARGENTINA   2003  ARG   LAC   ISRAEL   1981  ISR   MNA   NIGERIA   1993  NGA   SSA  
BOLIVIA   1995  BOL   LAC   ISRAEL   1973  ISR   MNA   NIGERIA   1986  NGA   SSA  
BOLIVIA   1993  BOL   LAC   ISRAEL   1974  ISR   MNA   RWANDA   1998  RWA   SSA  
BRAZIL   1993  BRA   LAC   ISRAEL   1978  ISR   MNA   RWANDA   1994  RWA   SSA  
BRAZIL   1992  BRA   LAC   ISRAEL   1984  ISR   MNA   RWANDA   2002  RWA   SSA  
COSTA RICA   1991  CRI   LAC   ISRAEL   1980  ISR   MNA   RWANDA   2003  RWA   SSA  
COSTA RICA   1998  CRI   LAC   ISRAEL   1986  ISR   MNA   RWANDA   1990  RWA   SSA  
COSTA RICA   1978  CRI   LAC   ISRAEL   1990  ISR   MNA   RWANDA   1996  RWA   SSA  
ECUADOR   1998  ECU   LAC   ISRAEL   1976  ISR   MNA   SENEGAL   1983  SEN   SSA  
ECUADOR   1993  ECU   LAC   ISRAEL   1992  ISR   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   2003  SLE   SSA  
ECUADOR   1999  ECU   LAC   ISRAEL   1987  ISR   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1986  SLE   SSA  
ECUADOR   1992  ECU   LAC   ISRAEL   1983  ISR   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1992  SLE   SSA  
EL SALVADOR   1987  SLV   LAC   ISRAEL   1982  ISR   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1985  SLE   SSA  
EL SALVADOR   1986  SLV   LAC   JORDAN   1988  JOR   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1990  SLE   SSA  
GUYANA   1995  GUY   LAC   JORDAN   1972  JOR   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1988  SLE   SSA  
GUYANA   1987  GUY   LAC   JORDAN   1990  JOR   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1995  SLE   SSA  
GUYANA   1989  GUY   LAC   LEBANON   1996  LBN   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1999  SLE   SSA  
GUYANA   1986  GUY   LAC   LEBANON   1994  LBN   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1993  SLE   SSA  
GUYANA   1994  GUY   LAC   LEBANON   1999  LBN   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1989  SLE   SSA  
GUYANA   1988  GUY   LAC   LEBANON   1993  LBN   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1987  SLE   SSA  
GUYANA   1980  GUY   LAC   MOROCCO   1983  MAR   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1996  SLE   SSA  
GUYANA   1976  GUY   LAC   MOROCCO   1997  MAR   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1998  SLE   SSA  
GUYANA   1982  GUY   LAC   MOROCCO   1992  MAR   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   1997  SLE   SSA  
GUYANA   1979  GUY   LAC   SAUDI ARABIA   1996  SAU   MNA   SIERRA LEONE   2001  SLE   SSA  
GUYANA   1991  GUY   LAC   SAUDI ARABIA   1998  SAU   MNA   SUDAN   1999  SDN   SSA  
GUYANA   1985  GUY   LAC   MALDIVES   1985  MDV   SAS   SUDAN   1998  SDN   SSA  
GUYANA   1975  GUY   LAC   MALDIVES   1982  MDV   SAS   SWAZILAND   1984  SWZ   SSA  
GUYANA   1992  GUY   LAC   NEPAL   1991  NPL   SAS   UGANDA   2001  UGA   SSA  
GUYANA   1990  GUY   LAC   PAKISTAN   1972  PAK   SAS   UGANDA   2002  UGA   SSA  
HAITI   2002  HTI   LAC   SRI LANKA   1991  LKA   SAS   ZAMBIA   1993  ZMB   SSA  
HONDURAS   1998  HND   LAC   SRI LANKA   1977  LKA   SAS   ZAMBIA   1982  ZMB   SSA  
HONDURAS   1992  HND   LAC   SRI LANKA   1985  LKA   SAS   ZAMBIA   1990  ZMB   SSA  
HONDURAS   1996  HND   LAC   BURUNDI   1996  BDI   SSA   ZAMBIA   1991  ZMB   SSA  
HONDURAS   1993  HND   LAC   BURUNDI   1999  BDI   SSA   ZAMBIA   1995  ZMB   SSA  
HONDURAS   1994  HND   LAC   BURUNDI   1998  BDI   SSA   ZAMBIA   1994  ZMB   SSA  
HONDURAS   1990  HND   LAC   BURUNDI   1987  BDI   SSA   ZAMBIA   1996  ZMB   SSA  
JAMAICA   1997  JAM   LAC   BURUNDI   2001  BDI   SSA   ZAMBIA   1986  ZMB   SSA  
JAMAICA   1984  JAM   LAC   BURUNDI   1988  BDI   SSA   ZAMBIA   1998  ZMB   SSA  
JAMAICA   1994  JAM   LAC   BURUNDI   1993  BDI   SSA   ZAMBIA   1984  ZMB   SSA  
JAMAICA   1998  JAM   LAC   BURUNDI   1986  BDI   SSA   ZAMBIA   1985  ZMB   SSA  
JAMAICA   1985  JAM   LAC   BURUNDI   1991  BDI   SSA   ZIMBABWE   1995  ZWE   SSA  
JAMAICA   1983  JAM   LAC   BURUNDI   1995  BDI   SSA         
JAMAICA   1993  JAM   LAC   BURUNDI   2002  BDI   SSA           33
 
Table A3. Episodes with δ<-10 
 
Country Year  Code  Region Country  Year  Code  Region
INDONESIA   1998  IDN  EAP  SAUDI ARABIA   1999  SAU  MNA 
ALBANIA   1998  ALB  ECA  MALDIVES   1984  MDV  SAS 
AUSTRALIA   1980  AUS  IND  MALDIVES   1983  MDV  SAS 
ECUADOR   2001  ECU  LAC  PAKISTAN   1973  PAK  SAS 
ECUADOR   2000  ECU  LAC  CHAD   1994  TCD  SSA 
GUYANA   1984  GUY  LAC  CHAD   1991  TCD  SSA 
GUYANA   1996  GUY  LAC  CHAD   1998  TCD  SSA 
GUYANA   1978  GUY  LAC  CONGO, DEM. REP. OF   1991  ZAR  SSA 
HONDURAS   1991  HND  LAC  CONGO, REPUBLIC OF   2000  COG  SSA 
JAMAICA   1992  JAM  LAC  COTE D IVOIRE   1998  CIV  SSA 
NICARAGUA   1996  NIC  LAC  ETHIOPIA   1995  ETH  SSA 
PANAMA   1989  PAN  LAC  GUINEA   1991  GIN  SSA 
PANAMA   1990  PAN  LAC  LESOTHO   2003  LSO  SSA 
ST. VINCENT & GRENS.   1997  VCT  LAC  LESOTHO   2002  LSO  SSA 
SURINAME   1975  SUR  LAC  NIGERIA   1995  NGA  SSA 
BAHRAIN, KINGDOM OF   1990  BHR  MNA  RWANDA   1995  RWA  SSA 
BAHRAIN, KINGDOM OF   1987  BHR  MNA  SIERRA LEONE   2000  SLE  SSA 
JORDAN   1992  JOR  MNA  SWAZILAND   1985  SWZ  SSA 
JORDAN   1989  JOR  MNA  TOGO   1985  TGO  SSA 
LEBANON   1997  LBN  MNA  UGANDA   1999  UGA  SSA 
MOROCCO   1991  MAR  MNA  UGANDA   1992  UGA  SSA 
OMAN   1992  OMN  MNA  ZAMBIA   1987  ZMB  SSA 
OMAN   1993  OMN  MNA  ZIMBABWE   1996  ZWE  SSA 
OMAN   1987  OMN  MNA        
OMAN   1999  OMN  MNA        
OMAN   1995  OMN  MNA        
OMAN   1989  OMN  MNA        
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Table A4. Debt Explosions 
Code Reg Year  deficit  d  θ  Code Reg Year  deficit  d  θ 
ALB ECA 1997 12 75 24 88 14 86 LSO SSA 1998 38 4 21 99 14 95
ARG  LAC  2002  1.11 89.12 92.20 LSO SSA 2000 3.44 23.97 16.43
BDI  SSA  1995  2.66 13.49 10.47 LSO SSA 2001 0.64 25.91 20.34
BDI  SSA  1987  1.02 12.11 13.05 MAR MNA 1984 6.04 15.49 11.05
BDI SSA  2003 5.10  18.45 13.68 MAR MNA 1981 13.36  18.02  11.71
BDI SSA  1986  -2.54  21.24 14.24 MAR MNA 1992 1.39  20.09  11.93
BDI  SSA  1992  8.91 22.55 15.31 MAR MNA 1983 7.75 22.99 14.84
BDI  SSA  1993  5.47 21.71 15.45 MDV SAS 1982 5.70 36.10 31.96
BDI SSA  1983 0.91  17.30 15.94 MEX LAC 1982 11.92  24.34  19.67
BDI SSA  1998 4.93  40.26 16.30 MEX LAC 1986 13.05  35.13  22.33
BDI SSA  1988  -0.73  18.35 16.72 MNG EAP 1996 7.68  31.12  12.53
BDI  SSA  1999  6.66 50.18 29.65 MNG EAP 1994 8.96 47.47 13.57
BDI SSA  2002 1.08  70.60 47.65 MNG EAP 1999 10.79  13.56  15.19
BEL  IND  1981  11.96 14.63 10.38 MNG EAP 1998 11.62 33.99 21.65
BEL  IND  1983  12.06 15.91 10.46 MNG EAP 1993 17.87 47.19 34.63
BEL  IND  1982  10.70 13.99 11.03 MUS SSA 1982 12.51 18.87 11.08
BLR ECA  1994 1.83  74.38 70.74 MWI SSA 1986 9.90  35.97  26.55
BOL  LAC  1993  4.74 18.38 12.00 NGA SSA 1990 8.47 51.07 10.76
CMR SSA  1993 1.73  9.29 11.91 NGA SSA 1983 9.44  24.67  23.90
CMR  SSA  1991  5.24 11.42 13.17 NGA SSA 1987 5.40 31.50 30.59
CMR SSA  1994 2.90  82.55 83.45 NGA SSA 1986 11.29  40.27  33.10
CRI  LAC  1978  4.36 19.34 13.93 NIC LAC 2002 1.34 26.98 14.50
DNK IND  1981 5.85  12.94 10.39 NIC LAC 1993 0.04  68.50  26.10
DNK IND  1993 2.44  13.74 11.44 NIC LAC 1994 0.02  79.53  39.60
DNK IND  1983 6.61  18.70 11.81 NIC LAC 1997 0.76  84.65  65.80
DNK IND  1982 7.78  16.79 13.05 NIC LAC 1991 -4.22  243.68 111.50
ECU  LAC  1999  0.59 27.56 28.30 NPL SAS 1991 8.00 18.57 11.97
ESP IND  1993  5.88  13.70 11.05 OMN MNA 1972 12.13  10.15  10.08
ETH SSA  1990 9.77  14.45 11.81 OMN MNA 1986 25.01  16.95  14.85
ETH SSA  1994 9.95  48.11 27.42 PAK SAS 1972 4.77 42.19 39.40
ETH  SSA  1993  5.49 44.03 40.80 PAN LAC 1978 6.49 14.07 11.52
FIN IND  1992  14.43  16.21 17.06 PAN LAC 1996 0.65  18.83  17.70
FIN IND  1993  13.07  16.99 17.83 PER LAC 1998 0.19  14.91  11.00
GEO  ECA  1998  3.49 16.83 10.34 PNG EAP 1994 2.54 16.29 10.74
GEO  ECA  1999  2.27 20.09 14.99 PNG EAP 2001 1.33 16.70 12.28
GHA  SSA  1993  2.51 12.09 11.55 RUS ECA 1999 1.18 23.25 15.60
GHA  SSA  1996  2.97 15.18 11.97 RUS ECA 1998 4.83 25.62 18.40
GIN  SSA  1998  4.34 19.31 14.04 RWA SSA 2002 2.17 17.06 12.09
GMB SSA 1978 10.01  17.01 14.22 RWA SSA 2003 3.48  23.72  16.93
GUY  LAC  1975  6.51 29.64 11.86 RWA SSA 1990 5.68 23.45 21.71
GUY LAC  1985 37.97  62.90 16.28 RWA SSA 1994 1.92  47.73  45.35
GUY LAC  1979 17.47  30.43 16.37 SAU MNA 1998 3.29  19.12  14.67
GUY LAC  1977 11.91  15.29 20.06 SAU MNA 1996 3.13  21.46  16.43
GUY LAC  1973 16.23  24.87 22.16 SDN SSA 1999 0.89  69.81  22.12
GUY LAC  1987 40.94  72.42 24.92 SLE SSA 1986 2.33  36.94  12.07
GUY  LAC  1984  45.55 33.35 27.91 SLE SSA 1980 12.78 21.92 15.54
GUY LAC  1976 27.46  44.75 31.24 SLE SSA 1995 5.67  34.68  16.56
GUY LAC  1986 60.20  107.29 45.37 SLE SSA 1996 5.76  34.51  19.21
GUY LAC  1990 21.65  303.58 47.99 SLE SSA 2003 7.04  46.65  27.35
GUY LAC  1991 24.38  226.70 53.53 SLE SSA 1990 2.45  51.44  27.90
GUY LAC  1989 6.98  136.35 66.95 SLE SSA 1992 4.85  72.50  38.11
GUY  LAC  1983  40.30 35.07 71.22 SLE SSA 2001 11.10 64.84 49.34
GUY LAC  1982 66.05  92.02 78.18 SLE SSA 1999 8.46  94.09  58.89
GUY LAC  1980 29.15  107.47 101.19 SLE SSA 1998 4.55  63.99  68.81
HND  LAC  1990  6.84 58.52 52.09 SLV LAC 1981 6.39 16.29 15.57
HRV ECA  1999 1.78  14.55 10.81 SUR LAC 1985 19.95  17.60  18.74
HRV ECA  1998 -0.91  15.50 12.30 SUR LAC 1986 25.04  29.45  28.69
HTI LAC  2002 2.71  17.93 14.10 SVK ECA 2001 3.17 14.60 12.39
HUN  ECA  1993  5.72 21.09 10.27 SWE IND 1992 4.84 14.84 11.66
IDN EAP  1978 3.14  14.19 10.74 SWE IND 1993 15.03  11.87  11.87
IDN  EAP  1982  1.90 13.61 11.07 SWE IND 1980 7.84 18.00 15.63
IDN  EAP  1986  3.52 22.13 19.86 SWZ SSA 1984 0.50 20.26 18.26
IDN EAP  1997 0.67  51.81 48.55 TCD SSA 1994 12.55  -2.27  10.09
ISR MNA  1984  18.84  223.12 10.49 TCD SSA 1992 12.79  13.12  10.13
ISR MNA  1981  21.97  142.39 15.02 TCD SSA 2000 4.80  5.95  12.55
ISR MNA  1976  18.39  59.67 20.77 TCD SSA 1993 5.54  12.60  15.21
ISR MNA  1979  15.12  89.61 24.64 TCD SSA 1999 5.96  24.08  17.14
ISR MNA  1977  19.43  69.90 36.42 TUN MNA 1986 7.14  14.82  11.03
ISR MNA  1980  16.17  130.39 45.36 TUR ECA 2001 19.64  48.71  39.23
ISR MNA  1983  26.78  300.14 189.53 UGA SSA 2001 2.19  24.62  20.96
JAM  LAC  1998  6.70 20.53 12.41 VCT LAC 1999 2.96 17.64 14.42
JAM LAC  1999 4.54  26.63 19.23 ZAR SSA 1996 0.32  158.19  10.11
JAM  LAC  1997  6.35 34.74 23.35 ZAR SSA 1975 5.85 12.95 10.89
JAM LAC  1983  19.88  66.10 57.16 ZAR SSA 1995 -0.02  207.28  63.39
JOR MNA  1987 8.97  14.97 11.26 ZAR SSA 1994 1.77  141.87  65.80
JOR MNA  1990 3.54  21.61 12.89 ZAR SSA 1990 6.53  233.42  192.21
JOR MNA  1988 9.05  141.95 140.37 ZMB SSA 1998 5.48  45.41  10.98
KOR  EAP  1981  3.25 15.71 15.04 ZMB SSA 1996 2.44 62.53 23.82
LBN MNA  1998 16.00  21.66 11.03 ZMB SSA 1991 45.15  135.08  32.77
LBN  MNA  1994  17.20 31.06 18.71 ZMB SSA 1982 18.56 44.08 33.11
LBN  MNA  1996  20.58 31.31 20.32 ZMB SSA 1985 15.17 74.69 55.22
LBN  MNA  1999  16.18 29.38 21.78 ZMB SSA 1990 8.65 127.72 59.23
LKA SAS  1977 4.59  17.31 10.56 ZMB SSA 1986 15.03  158.14 107.10
LKA  SAS  1985  9.68 25.05 12.00 ZWE SSA 1984 8.10 16.58 10.69
LKA SAS  1988  12.70  21.03 13.36 ZWE SSA 1995 9.40  33.82  21.72  35
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